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Abstract 
 
This paper studies how the stock prices in Chinese stock markets react to the stock recommenda-
tions from a Chinese business newspaper Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Bao (China Security). Using 
event study methodology and market model as a benchmark, we calculate abnormal returns to as-
certain the impact of published recommendations. We find that there are no statistically significant 
long-term abnormal returns associated with the published recommendations. However, there are 
profitable opportunities if investors act prior to the published recommendations. We also find that 
the recommendations from the newspaper causes a significant short term movement two days after 
the publication day, suggesting a delayed response from the investors who act on the recommen-
dation. The delayed response shows the gradual dissemination of the information in Chinese stock 
markets. In summary, these results indicate that press recommendations of Chinese stocks contain 
no useful economic information for investors who act on the published recommendations. The 
possible abnormal returns for investors who buy the stocks before the recommendations are made 
public are evidence of a market that is strong-form inefficient and the delayed response from in-
vestors to the newspaper recommendations is most likely the evidence of a market that is 
semi-strong-form inefficient. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
his paper empirically investigates the impact of the stock recommendations from a Chinese business 
newspaper Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Bao (China Security). We will test whether investors can make 
abnormal trading profits by following the newspaper recommendations in CS.  The efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) holds that stock prices fully reflect all available information at all times. This especially applies to 
publicly available information and suggests that published stock 'tips' cannot provide abnormal returns to investors 
acting on them.  If they did, that would imply that tips supply new information not previously available to the market. 
 
 However, published stock recommendations from brokerage houses, security analysts, and investment news 
letters abound in stock markets worldwide. Not only do security analysts believe they can earn superior returns,
1
 but 
also some academic researchers suggest that superior returns are possible. Stickel (1995) show positive returns on 
stock recommendations. Womack (1996) shows the brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment value. 
Similar positive findings can also be found in Palmon, Sun and Tang (1994); Wijmenga (1990); Syed, Liu and Smith 
(1989).  Barber, Lehavy, Mcnichols, and Trueman (2001) document that investment strategies based on the consensus 
recommendations, in conjunction with active portfolio management yield annual abnormal returns greater than four 
percent. 
 
 The finance and acco 
unting literature is replete with the studies of stock price reaction to the analysts’ recommendations. However most of 
these studies use the US stock market data. Few studies exist of emerging markets.  A literature search found only 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Netherlands markets as examples of prior studies  
______________________ 
T 
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Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
of abnormal returns from published recommendations in emerging markets. 
 
We analyze daily abnormal returns in the Stock Exchange of Shanghai and Senzhen resulting from published 
stock recommendations of the largest business newspaper in China Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Bao (China Security).  
Using the sample from January, 2001 to December, 2001, we examine how the stock prices in Chinese stock markets 
react to the stock recommendations. Using event study methodology and market model as a benchmark, we calculate 
abnormal returns to ascertain the impact of published recommendations.  We find that there are no statistically sig-
nificant long-term abnormal returns associated with the published recommendations. However, there are profitable 
opportunities if investors act prior to the published recommendations. We also find that the recommendations from the 
newspapers cause a significant short term movement two days after the publication day, suggesting a delayed response 
from the investors who act on the recommendation. The delayed response shows the gradual dissemination of the 
information in Chinese stock markets. In summary, these results indicate that press recommendations of Chinese 
stocks contain no useful economic information for investors who act on the published recommendations. The possible 
abnormal returns for investors who buy the stocks before the recommendations are made public are evidence of a 
market that is strong-form inefficient and the delayed response from investors to the newspaper recommendations is  
most likely the evidence of a market that is semi-strong-form inefficient. 
 
Following Lawrence, Sun, and Cai (1996), we ask the following five questions in our paper: 
 
(1) Do security prices on the Shanghai and Senzhen react to the recommendations published in CS?  
(2) Is there any information leakage prior to the publication of share recommendations?   
(3) Do the recommendations possess real economic content or permanence, or are they merely a 'self-fulfilling 
prophecy'?   
(4) Can investors expect profit by following these recommendations?   
(5) Why are significant positive and negative abnormal returns detected before and after publication? 
 
 The Plan of this paper is as follows. In section II, we present our data. Section III explains the model and 
methodology. The empirical results are analyzed in section IV. A summary and conclusions section ends the paper. 
 
2.  The Sample Data 
 
 The analyst recommendations used in this study are from Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Bao (China Security, CS 
thereafter). To test the impact of the publication of recommendations on abnormal returns, we define event day (day 0) 
as publication date.  The period plus and minus 10 days surrounding the event day is the 'event window.' 
 
 Stock recommendations are published daily in the two nationally circulated business newspapers in China: 
China Security and Shanghai Security. However there is no existing database for the stock recommendations. We have 
to manually go over the newspaper for the data collection. Given the limited amount of the resources for this research 
we choose CS because it is the largest business newspapers in China. 
 
 The same stock might be recommended the same day from Shanghai Security. To overcome this “overlapping” 
issue, we check the stock recommendations in Shanghai Zheng Quan Bao (Shanghai Security, SS thereafter). If the 
same stock is also recommended in SS we will remove the stock from being selected into the sample. The other type of 
“overlapping” is the same stock recommendations in consecutive weeks from CS. We will exclude the stock if it is 
recommended in consecutive weeks. 
 
 Our sample includes recommendations from January 2001 to December 2001.  Over a period of 12 months, a 
total of 120 recommendations were selected. We will only test the favorable recommendations since almost all the 
recommendations in Chinese newspapers are favorable recommendations. 
 
 The share data are obtained from Stockstar and Yahoo China. The stock sample includes stocks from 
communication industry, pharmaceutical industry, stocks from wine industry, stocks from chemical industry, retail 
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industry, conglomerate, electronics industry, and financial industry.  These stocks are representative of the Chinese 
stock market. 
 
 To use market model as a benchmark to calculate the abnormal return, we need market return data. We use 
Shanghai Composite Index for the market return proxy in our model. For the estimation of the market model, we use a 
history of two hundred daily returns before the event day to estimate the parameters of the market model. 
 
3.  Model and Methodology 
 
 We use market-and-risk-adjusted model to estimate the magnitude of share price adjustments (abnormal 
returns) each day of the event window. The model used in our paper is called market model which served as the basis 
for the pioneering event study conducted by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). Later Brown and Warner (1980) 
found that this simple model was more powerful in terms of its ability to identify abnormal performance than any of 
the other, more complex risk-adjusted models available. 
 
 The market model used to estimate the abnormal return for the jth stock in period t is as follows: 
 
R j,t= α j + βj Rm,t+ εj,t                   (1) 
 
Where 
 
Rj,t = return on security j on day t 
Rm,t = return on market on day t 
α j = a constant over time, stable component of security returns 
βj = beta of stock j, assume stable over time 
εj,t  = error term or return due to non-market forces  (abnormal return). 
 
 Equation (1) is used to find the normal or expected returns. According to this model, each security's return in 
period t is expressed as a linear function of the contemporaneous return on the market and a random error term ( j,t) 
which reflects security specific returns. 
 
 The coefficients of the linear market model (α, β) are estimated by regressing observed rates of return for stock 
j on the corresponding rates of return for a market index. In computing these parameters daily, instead of monthly, data 
are used because price adjustments may occur within a few days after publication. Brown and Warner (1985) found 
that for daily returns the market model was most successful in identifying abnormal performance.
2
 
 
 We use GARCH model to improve the estimation accuracy. Since ordinary least squares (OLS) models as-
sume homoscedasticity in the error terms. A growing body of literature indicates that many daily return series exhibit 
heteroscedasticity and the variance of the forecast error will depend on the size of the preceding disturbance.
3
 ARCH 
or GARCH models have been widely used to deal with this heteroscedasticity problem in the time series analysis. 
4
 
 
 We collected the 200 daily returns for each recommended stock.  Then, we divided the data into two time pe-
riods: the estimation period and the event window.  The time line of whole sample period is denoted from T=-189 to 
T=+10. We estimated market model parameters over the estimation period beginning T = -189 through T = –11.  This 
yields an estimation period of 179 days.  The event window period has twenty-one days from T=-10 to T=+10 in-
cluding T=0, the event day. 
 
 Assuming that the estimated parameters α and β remain unchanged over our sample period, the expected return 
E(Rj,t) is computed for each stock over the event window, from t = –10 to t = +10.  
 
E(R j,t)= α j + βj Rm,t                   (2) 
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 The abnormal return (ARj,t) of stock j is defined as the deviation of each return on the stock j from its expected 
return, given the return earned by the market index during day t.  Using estimation period data to estimate market 
model parameters and assuming that these parameters hold in the event-window, the abnormal returns in the 
event-window period are estimated as follows: 
 
ARj,t = Rj,t - E(R j,t),    or    ARj,t = Rj,t – (α j + βj Rm,t )                (3) 
 
Where Rj,t and Rm,t are the observed daily returns for security j and the market index, respectively, on day t during the 
event window. 
 
If publication of share recommendations has no impact on the sample stocks, then on average, one would not expect 
any abnormal return: 
 
E(ARj,t) = 0                      (4) 
 
Assuming the standard assumptions hold. 
 
 To determine the statistical significance of abnormal returns on any event day t of stock j, we first compute 
the Standardized Prediction Error (SPEj,t), an approach originally proposed by Patell [1976], and popularized in the 
finance literature by Dodd and Warner [1983].
5
  Next, we construct the test statistic Zt for every day t in the event 
window, for all N stocks.
6
  As the SPEt for a particular event window day aggregates observations from different 
periods and across all sample stocks, unfavorable and favorable effects of confounding events may be offset. 
 
 Assuming that abnormal returns (ARj,t) are independently distributed and have a finite variance and that the 
publication of share recommendations does not lead to abnormal returns, the null hypothesis is that publication of 
share recommendations in CS has no systematic effect on recommended stocks' prices: 
 
H0:  publication of stock recommendations in CS has no statistically significant impact on stock price 
H1:  publication of stock recommendations in CS has a statistically-significant impact on stock price 
 
 We also investigate the true economic impact or permanence of the press recommendations to ascertain 
whether or not a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' effect exists.  Additionally, we explore whether following press recom-
mendations enable abnormal profits.  We compute the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) to analyze the 
aggregate effect of such published information in the days prior to publication to determine whether any 'leakage' 
occurs.
7
 
 
 To ascertain abnormal cumulative return in the event window, we standardize each ACAR and test for sig-
nificance by computing the statistic Z(t1,t2) or ZACAR, assuming that abnormal returns during the estimation period are 
independently distributed and the distribution of the test statistics is standard normal.
8
 
 
  ZSCPE or the test statistic for the sum of the standardized cumulative prediction errors [see: Henderson, (1990), 
pp. 298-9] calculates the sum of standardized residuals instead of the standardized sum of residuals.  That means 
statistically significant but relatively small abnormal returns from a series with normally small residuals will have 
equal weight with statistically significant but larger abnormal returns from a series with normally larger residuals 
[Wijmenga (1990)].  This contrasts with the ZACAR in which relatively small abnormal returns are "swamped" by rel-
atively large abnormal returns. 
 
4.  Result Analyses 
 
  To examine the impact of recommendations we first examine the average relative stock price unadjusted (for 
market changes) for the event window period from day -10 to day +10.  The results are shown in Figure 1. The relative 
price is defined as: 
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(price on day t)/(price on day -10). 
 
 There are insignificant changes with small up and down in relative prices from day -9 and day -6, indicating 
a random pattern of the stock price movements. From day -5 to day 1 relative prices stay above the 1 mark, indicating 
a strong stock price movement during that period. From the event day to day +2, the relative stock prices are drifting 
down. On day +3, there is big jump in relative price. The relative prices trend downward from  day +4 to day +7. From 
day +8 to day +10 the relative prices go upward back to the 1 mark, ending almost where it start from day -10. 
 
 
Figure 1
Relative Price over the Event Window
Stock Recommendations in CS:1/01-12/01
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Relative price on day t is defined as the ratio of the market price on day t divided by the price on day -10. 
 
 
 Figure 2 shows the average abnormal returns during the event window period. The big upward movement on 
day +3 confirms the similar movement in the relative price in Figure 1.  The large abnormal return on day +3 suggests 
a delayed response from the investors who read the newspaper but do not act promptly.  From day +4 to day +10, the 
abnormal returns first trend downwards and then upwards, a similar pattern observed in Figure 1. 
 
 The delayed reaction from investors on day +3 illustrates that many investors will take some time to react to 
the stock recommendations because either they have access to the newspaper recommendation one or more days after 
the recommendation appear in the newspaper or they find impractical to engage in the daily trading as suggested in 
Barber, Lehavy, Mcnichols, and Trueman (2001). The evidence of delayed response from investors to analyst’s 
recommendations is also documented in the finding of Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996). 
 
 To see if investors will earn abnormal return profits by following the newspaper recommendations we 
compute the average cumulative abnormal returns CAR.  The results of cumulative abnormal returns are shown in 
Figure 3. From day -10 to day  -1, the period before the event day, the cumulative abnormal returns reach 3.26%. From 
the event day to day +10, the cumulative abnormal returns are 1.09% (4.35 on day +10 minus 3.26 on day -1). 
 
 We derive two conclusions from Figure 3: first, the average transaction costs in Chinese stock markets for a 
round trading are above one percent. Investors are unable to earn an abnormal return profit by buying the recom-
mended stock on day 0 since the cumulative abnormal returns are around one percent from day 0 to day +10; Second, 
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investors are able to make abnormal returns if they know the stock recommendation prior to the recommendation 
publication.   If an investor buy the recommended stock from day -10 and hold it to the day +1 the cumulative ab-
normal returns are 4.07. On day +2, a day after the event day, ACAR value falls, suggesting a price reversal. The 
evidence of price reversals is also documented in studies by Lloyd-Davies and Canes (1978), Wijmenga (1990), and 
Lawrence, Sun, and Cai (1996).  
 
 
Figure 2
Average Abnormal Return Over the Window Period
Stock Recommendations in CS:1/01-12/01
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 Abnormal return is defined as:  ARj,t = Rj,t – (α j + βj Rm,t ) 
 
 
 
 In order to draw a reliable conclusion we perform Z-tests for AAR and ACAR. The corresponding results are 
shown in Table 1.  There are only one statistically significant AR on day +3 and one AR close to the 10% significant 
level on day -1. There are no statistically significant CARs either before or after the event day, although CAR on day 
+4 is very close to the 10% significance level. 
 
 Lawrence, Sun, and Cai (1996) found in their study of the Singapore stock market that Clients of the bro-
kerage firms may have acted on 'buy' recommendations prior to recommendation publication. The statistically sig-
nificant AR in our paper on day -1 prior to the recommendation day shows some investors in Chinese stock markets  
are able to benefit from the recommendations before the recommendations are made public.  This result suggests that 
the recommendations might be “ leaked” to investors who act onthe  
 
 The significant AR on day +3 with .787% doesn’t warrant a profitable short term trading strategy based on 
the published recommendation. As mentioned above a round trading of buying and selling to take profit in Chinese 
stock markets would involve transactions amounting to commissions and taxes of above one percent. However, in-
vestors are able to make a short term abnormal return profit by buying the recommended stocks before the recom-
mendations are published, a trading strategy that requires “insider information.”   Who are those possible profitable 
traders? They may be the clients of the brokerage houses that make the stock recommendations, or may be the people 
in the journal, or may be the people in the publication printing agency. The Z-value of 1.5637 for ACAR of 4.91% on 
day +4 is very close to ten percent significant level (or significant at 11.86% level.) From day 0 to day +4 the ACAR is 
1.13% (4.91% (day +4) – 3.78 (day 0).) A strategy of buying the recommended stocks on day 0 after the recom-
mendation is published does not yield a reliable abnormal return net of transaction costs.  
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Figure 3
Cumulative Abnormal Returns over the Event 
Window
Stock Recommendations in CS:1/01-12/01
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Cumulative abnormal return is defined as:  CARj,t = CARj,t-1 + ARj,t 
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
 In this paper, we have examined the impact of stock recommendations in a Chinese newspaper CS. This 
paper studies how the stock prices in Chinese stock markets react to the stock recommendations from a Chinese 
business newspaper Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Bao (China Security). Using event study methodology and market model 
as a benchmark, we calculate abnormal returns to ascertain the impact of published recommendations. We find that 
there are no statistically significant long-term abnormal returns associated with the published recommendations. 
However, there are profitable opportunities if investors act prior to the published recommendations.  
 
 We also find that the recommendations from the newspaper China Security causes a significant short term 
movement two days after the publication day, suggesting a delayed response from the investors who act on the rec-
ommendations. The delayed response shows the gradual dissemination of the information in Chinese stock markets.  
The delayed response of investors to the analysts’ recommendations is consistent with the findings of price drift both 
in the US stock market as in Barber, Lehavy, Mcnichols, and Trueman (2001), Stickel (1995), and Womack (1996) 
and in the emerging stock markets such as Singapore stock market as in Lawrence, Sun, and Cai (1996). 
 
 In summary, these results indicate that press recommendations of Chinese stocks contain no useful economic 
information for investors who act on the published recommendations. The possible abnormal returns for investors who 
buy the stocks before the recommendations are made public are evidence of a market that is strong-form inefficient 
and the delayed responses from investors to the newspaper recommendations are most likely are the evidence of a 
market is semi-strong-form inefficient. 
 
 Several problems have emerged during our research that we have not attempted to solve. Some of them are 
mentioned below for further study in the future. (i) As has been discussed in the paper, there is a statistical evidence 
that the recommendations might be “leaked” to investors who act on them prior to the publication of the recommen-
dations. The further research is needed to find out how the information is “leaked” – by the journalists? or by the 
Journal of Business And Economics Research                                                                               Volume 1, Number 3 
 44 
Table 1: AAR (%), ACAR (%) and Corresponding Z-Statistics for the Sample over the Event Window 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Day  AAR   Z-Value   ACAR   Z-Value 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
-10  0.411553   0.987728   0.411553   0.107004 
-9  0.297332   0.749276   0.708885   0.185728 
-8  0.210325   0.555257   0.91921   0.242671 
-7  0.180847   0.484669   1.100056   0.294815 
-6  -0.10761   -0.30991   0.992448   0.263991 
-5  0.469546   1.108128   1.461993   0.394738 
-4  0.579553   1.32138   2.041546   0.5553 
-3  0.12509   0.345247   2.166635   0.593658 
-2  0.405101   0.988445   2.571736   0.709799 
-1  0.687888   1.5487≈   3.259624   0.906176 
0  0.523829   1.215283   3.783453   1.066934 
1  0.296101   0.758018   4.079554   1.174911 
2  -0.31983   -0.9339   3.759725   1.052723 
3  0.787187   1.83182*   4.546912   1.336792 
4  0.363711   0.902004   4.910623   1.57387*≈ 
5  -0.35144   -1.04027   4.55918   1.349517 
6  0.092326   0.258513   4.651506   1.386149 
7  -0.58497   -1.46243   4.066536   1.163029 
8  -0.10134   -0.28782   3.965192   1.126115 
9  0.139913   0.380564   4.105106   1.190481 
10  0.24787   0.644462   4.352976   1.271069 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
* significant at 10% level. 
*≈ significant at 12% level. 
 
 
analysts themselves.  (ii) The sample of 120 recommendations is not considered too small for a research in an 
emerging stock market. However, a larger sample will certainly help us to gain additional statistical insights into the 
emerging market behavior.  (iii) We have investigated the impact of buy recommendations on the stock price behavior. 
What about sell recommendations? Do sell recommendations have the similar impacts as buy recommendations? 
Whether the results we have obtained here are robust to, different data sources, different kinds of recommendations is 
left to the future work.    
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Endnotes 
 
1  Investment bankers and brokerage houses spend a great amount of money on security analysis, pre-
sumably because these firms and their clients believe its use can generate abnormal returns. 
2  Our study does not take into account the effect of non-synchronicity inherent in daily data.  Studies by Brown 
and Warner (BW) (1985) indicated ignoring this factor does not result in the misspecification of event study 
methodologies using OLS regression.  Daily data may mean non-normality in returns.  However, BW (1985) 
found that mean excess returns in a cross section of securities converges to normality as the portfolio size 
increases.  For our portfolio of 69 stocks, we assume the return distribution is normal.  BW also demonstrated 
that adjustments for autocorrelations in daily data do not significantly change results. 
3    See, for example:  Engle (1982), Kryzanowski and Zhang (1993), Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1991), 
Baillie and DeGennaro (1989), Pagan (1996), and Lawrence, Sun, and Cai (1996).  
4  Please see Bollerslev, T., R. Chou and K. Kroner (1992) for its use in finance research. 
5 See, also:  Patell and Wolfson (1979). 
6 See:  Henderson (1990), p. 299. 
7 See, for example:  Henderson (1990), p. 297. 
8 The test statistics employed follow:  Lawrence, Sun, and Cai (1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
